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Networks, power and politics : The power of business in Britain and Italy before and during the interwar period 
in comparative perspective 
 
By 
Andrea Colli ( Bocconi University, Italy ) and Mary B. Rose ( Lancaster University) 
[This is a preliminary draft and may not be quoted without the authors’ permission] 
 
One of the most striking contrasts, if British and Italian business is compared during the interwar period, is the 
difference in the relative political power of businessmen, especially industrialists. In interwar Italy, government-
industry relations were increasingly close, with industrialists enjoying considerable power. This was despite the fact that 
employers’ associations were imperfectly developed at the beginning of the twentieth century only emerging as 
economic growth gathered momentum. Even then their declared  goal was not political action. (Baglioni, 1974: 189 ff.; 
Berta 1998, IX) By contrast in Britain, despite an increasing level of organization and a growing parliamentary 
presence, industrialists were politically impotent. ( Grant 1993 : 16-7; Turner 1978 : 553) Campaigns for protection and 
imperial preference, which gained in popularity in Britain even before the First World War and gathered pace in the 
1920s, were vigorous but singularly unsuccessful in securing any policy modifications. On the other hand, relations 
between Italian industrialists and the state were increasingly close and can best be described as reciprocal. ( Amatori 
1998: 255 ff.; Colli and Rose 1999)  
Considerable attention has been directed towards explaining differences in the form and conduct of twentieth 
century government-industry relations internationally, in the twentieth century, with models varying from what has 
been described as the company state , as in the United States, where dominant firms lobby government through a 
decentralised political system, to a ‘party state’, as in Italy, where government-industry intermediation is through 
factions within the dominant political party in which industrialists are normally ‘insiders’. Britain, on the other hand, 
has been placed somewhere in the middle of these two extremes, with arms-length government-industry relations and 
associations acting as negotiators between government and the state. Similarly political scientists have also explored the 
relationship between the political system and the conduct and construction of commercial policy (Grant 1993: 9-17; 
Katzenstein (ed.),1978) In terms of the political bargaining power of businessmen in Britain and Italy attention has been 
given at the national level to the manoeuvrings of industrialists. 
  Italian historians have especially concentrated on the emergence of a powerful liberal, industrial bourgeoisie 
especially following the late 1880s’ tariff reforms. ( Baglioni 1974: 366 ff.; Lanaro 1979). They have also looked at the 
evolution of employers’ associations immediately before and after the First World War against the background of   2
socialist movements. (Berta 1978: 1100-6; Adler 1995: 18 ff.) These are not the only perspectives on government- 
industry relations, however, since the heavy reliance of the State on industry, during the First World War, significantly 
bolstered their bargaining power. (Amatori 1997: 256) The increasingly intimate relationship between industry and 
government continued during the inter war period, especially during the 1930s. Accordingly the Fascist government 
established a reciprocal relationship with industrialists, especially with big business. In return for industrial co-operation 
it granted protection, orders, financial aid in the form of rescue packages, and the support of non-economic production 
to secure both social and economic benefit. (Amatori 1998: 259; Sarti 1977: 103 ff.)  
In Britain attention has been directed towards the growing prominence, but ineffectiveness of the Tariff 
Reform Movement, and the proliferation of organisations representing industrialists’ interests during the First World 
War. There has been a realisation that British industry lacked familiarity with political manoeuvring, compared with  
European, North American and Japanese counterparts in the interwar period. (Marrison 1995; Turner 1978: 553; 
Tolliday 1984 : 74)Yet little attention has been given to understanding such international differences and where the 
relative bargaining power of industrialists has been considered, in a British context, the focus has been on explaining 
why  the ‘gentlemen capitalists of the City of London were so much more successful in influencing government than 
manufacturers . ( Cain and Hopkins 1993)  
  The purpose of this article is to focus on why there were such contrasts in the political power of 
industrialists in Britain and Italy during the interwar period and in so doing highlight the evolution and relative 
effectiveness of networks within industry and between industry and the state. This paper will analyse the differing 
characteristics of these networks in Britain and Italy but, since their power, form and effectiveness changed through 
time, it will highlight the  range of historical, social, political and economic forces which influenced government-
industry relations in the two countries during the 1920s and 1930s.  Much recent work has revered networks, as much as 
anything as a welcome alternative to United States’ centric work on the rise of big business . Consequently the notion of 
network arrangements, as a viable alternative theoretical construct within which to study business is to be welcomed. 
(see for example essays in Nohria and Eccles 1992; Hamilton 1996; and the Special Issue of Industrial and Corporate 
Change 1995) Yet the seemingly benign interpretations of network behaviour can be taken too far, especially in the 
context of government-industry relations in Fascist Italy in the interwar period, as this paper will illustrate. The paper 
will be divided into four sections with the first laying down the theoretical and conceptual frame-work based upon a 
combination of network and institutional theory and history. The second section will analyse the development of 
government –industry relations in Britain and Italy until the end of the First World War and will give particular 
emphasis to efforts by industrialists to influence government policy. In a third section the extent of the interplay of 
contemporary and historical forces, in shaping government-industry relations,  will be considered. This will allow the   3
analysis of the sources of differences in the political power of industrialists in Britain and Italy, in the concluding final 
section. This section  will highlight how far, for example, differences in political power stemmed from variations in the 
experience of industrialisation, in the nature of interaction between government and industry and in the types of 
networks which developed. It will also explore the extent to which differences in the bargaining power of industrialists 
with governments stemmed from the specific economic and political conditions and priorities of the interwar period.  
I  Theory and History: Networks and government-industry relations 
Designed to increase confidence and reduce uncertainty, through the development of mutual trust and flows of 
information, networks have become an increasingly important way of understanding business arrangements in recent 
years. (see for example Biggart and Hamilton 1992; Grannoveter 1985 and 1996; Gerlach and Lincoln 1992) This is 
particularly true in Asian societies which demonstrate a high level of collectivism. However, it seems reasonable to 
argue, even in relatively individualistic societies, such as Britain and Italy, that firms should be viewed in the context of 
their various networks rather than simply as individual entities. (Hofstede 1994 : 53)This is because the individuals who 
run them will look for ways of reducing business hazards, whilst some at least will be interested in enhancing their level 
of power, whether in the market place or politically. 
The formation of networks is heavily dependent upon the institutional ‘rules of the game’ which may be formal 
laws governing such areas as collusive activity or determining the legitimate forms of collective pressure.  These help to 
mould both the type of networking to emerge and the capabilities of any networks which may develop. Alternatively 
they may relate to informal codes of behaviour, attitudes and value systems which underpin loose groupings of firms or 
individuals. Either way they are important because they help to create order and the basis for co-operation in an 
otherwise uncertain world. For example, formal laws and regulations are the basis of property rights, whilst informal 
codes underpin trust and shape expectations of the likely behaviour of associates. As a consequence, the institutional 
background is the critical reference point and foundation stone which affects the evolution of organizations, whether 
economic or political and influences expectations and human responses. (North 1990 : 1-5) Since both formal and 
informal codes and rules vary internationally, it is clear that the institutional environment is a vital factor explaining 
why the character and capabilities of business networks may also vary between countries. 
Embedded in societies and moulded by institutions, networks can, therefore, be viewed as being more than the 
intermediate arrangements which lie between firms and markets, but as an integral part of economic activity which is 
itself moulded by social and cultural influences, as well as by market signals. This suggests that although the market 
may trigger collective as opposed to individualistic responses by firms, the form these responses take and their 
effectiveness depends upon the social cohesion and hence on the level of trust and understanding which exists between 
the parties to any agreement. In addition, the form of any arrangement will depend critically upon a combination of   4
market, institutional, social and legal characteristics. (Casson 1993:40-43; Biggart and Hamilton 1992 : 471-90; 
Hamilton and Feenstra 1995 : 51-87)  
The networking arrangements of firms undoubtedly enable their owners to gain information and reduce 
uncertainty in the their business dealings but, in certain circumstances, particular types of networks may also enhance  
economic and political power whilst their form and relative effectiveness may vary internationally.  Collective 
economic arrangements by groups of firms lead to the creation of cartels to control output and prices, while trade 
associations and pressure groups increase the political power of business and facilitate negotiations with civil servants 
and politicians. (Grant 1993 : 33) Indeed, inevitably there exists a correlation between heavily cartelised sectors and the 
ability of groups of industrialists within them to exercise political power. Equally the attitudes of government, in 
framing legislation relating to collective arrangements, will influence their prevalence, organisation and prospects of 
success. Consequently in some societies, such as the United States, although economic collusion has been outlawed 
since the late nineteenth century, lobbying is seen as an integral and essential part of the democratic process and as a 
vital way of preventing the development of undue concentrations of power. (Grant 1995 : 23)  The stability of the 
political system is an important consideration affecting the power and effectiveness of interest groups and it has been 
argued that in some countries a long tradition of stable democracy may harbour such entrenched interest groups that 
overall economic performance can be undermined through ‘institutional sclerosis’. (Olson 1982: 78 
Individual networks have been likened to networks of trust where a coincidence of values and attitudes reduces 
transaction costs and encourages collective activity. ( Casson 1991 : 169-70)  Clearly in looking at groups intent on 
exercising political power such attributes are vital. However the effectiveness of pressure groups does not merely 
depend upon the internal cohesion of a group, but also upon its ability to communicate effectively with other 
organisations, an ability which is itself partly culturally determined. What are crucial here are  both the values and 
attitudes of the members of a pressure group and the extent to which they are capable of understanding and adapting to 
the priorities and behaviour of politicians and civil servants. This will, in turn, determine how far they can pursue 
‘insider’ as opposed to ‘outsider’ strategies with respect to their dealings with the state. ‘Insiders’ typically operate 
within the political system in which the state and civil servants set the ‘rules of the game’ and in which pressure groups 
adapt their strategies to fit these norms of behaviour and in so doing enhance their bargaining power. ‘Outsiders’ on the 
other hand, may often appear politically naïve and, through a lack of appreciation of appropriate codes of behaviour and 
a parochialism in appreciating wider considerations, undermine the power of their case. (Grant 1995: 22-3) 
Consequently even the most united grouping may be unable to influence a government if profound cultural differences 
between industrialists, civil servants and politicians prevent meaningful interaction. Yet education, social background 
and the like, whilst vital, are not the only factors determining whether any campaign will have an impact. Much also   5
depends upon the extent to which the wider political and economic priorities of the state and of the narrower concerns 
of an industrial pressure group coincide both historically and in any particular period.  In addition the ability to 
convince a wider audience of the public welfare gains of specific course of action may also be critical determinants of 
success or failure. (Grant 1993: 130) The choice of insider as opposed to outsider activity may depend heavily upon 
historical forces shaping the cultural characteristics of pressure groups and those within the political system. The ability 
to shift from outsider to insider activity may change through time depending upon the nature of the cause and the ability 
of those involved to build an understanding of the priorities, procedures and practices of those within. Such choices are 
also likely to vary internationally, as a result of differences in the cultural background of politicians, industrialists and 
the norms of behaviour surrounding their interaction. 
If international differences in the behaviour and relative success of pressure groups in government-industry 
relations is partly dependent upon social, cultural and political considerations, it is clearly important to place 
arrangements in any period in an appropriate historical context. This allows national differences in the experience of 
industrialisation, in the evolution of the role of government in industrial development and in the development of 
pressure groups to be set alongside attitudes to business, to collective pressure and to those social forces moulding 
human behaviour. In addition, if any credence is to be given to Olson’s notion of institutional sclerosis, then the 
emergence of the political power of interest groups must be cumulative and its evolution should be analysed. ( Olson 
1982)  Clearly, historical forces are vital to the understanding of the relative political strength of business and the 
detailed analysis of experience in Britain and Italy will demonstrate the substantial continuities of experience which 
existed by the interwar period. Yet an emphasis on continuity should not mask the role of changes, since the impact of 
contemporary conditions may act as important catalysts to the development of political power in business. They may 
bring specific interest groups to the fore, trigger new legislation and hence alter the institutional environment or they 
may intensify government-industry arrangements in important ways.  
 
II  The Development of Government –Industry Relations in Britain and Italy to 1918 
 
  During the twentieth century it is fairly clear that whereas Italian industrialists can be regarded as ‘insiders’ in 
the political system, in Britain they remained outsiders. This section will explore the combination of historical, 
economic, social and political trends which created this position.  
It is to be expected that during the early stages of industrialisation family firms would be embedded in a 
complex array of external personal and often local networks. A hazardous economic environment, combined usually 
with imperfect formal institutions, goes a long way towards explaining the predominance of family firms. Thus,   6
whether discussion is of eighteenth century Britain, nineteenth century Italy or twentieth century developing countries, 
the owners of mainly small-scale firms have seen the family as the ideal interface between the market and the firm. 
(Ben-Porath 1980: 1-30; Nafzriger 1969; 25-33) The family, widely defined to include that extended kinship group of 
cousins, in- laws and connections in the local business community, especially from within religious groupings, therefore 
represented more than just a reservoir of skill, labour and finance. It was a network of trust, the use of which reduced 
the transaction costs and the dangers and uncertainties of business activity. Thus, although the family might represent an 
internal market for managerial labour, a source of funds for establishment and expansion and of market information, the 
boundaries of the family business have usually lain within a rather wider group with a shared culture and values. It is 
within such a configuration that transactions have been undertaken and information has flowed. ( Casson 1982 : 302-7; 
Casson 1991 : 169-70; Casson 1997: 151; Pollak 1985: 581-608)  
In the intensely uncertain world of early industrialisation such vertical, localised networks were a fact of life 
for the family business owner. In such circumstances the very intensity of competition would normally prevent the 
creation of formal or informal collusive arrangements or the exertion of substantial economic or political power by 
firms. Yet the development of groupings, whose function was to exert pressure on other organisations, whether trade 
unions or the government, on issues of policy, tended to occur at the local level and be, in the first instance, based upon 
the capabilities of the business community. These groupings, whether formal or informal, provided the interface 
between firms and  other elements of the economy and wider society. Their behaviour and success depended upon their 
internal cohesion and external economic, social and political conditions, while their ability to communicate and bargain 
with other organisations depended heavily upon the internal characteristics and priorities of those organisations. In the 
early industrialisation of New England, in the United States, all the evidence suggests that wealthy mercantile Boston 
families enjoyed an enviable combination of economic and political power, which enabled them to manipulate both the 
market and government policy at least until the 1840s. Similarly in Japanese industrialisation the power of the Zaibatsu 
families was closely linked to their ties with the state while in Korea there have been intimate ties between the families 
running the Chaebol and the state.( Danzell, 1987; Rose 1996; Morikawa 1992; Amsden 1989)  
Britain 
Government-industry relations based upon the relative strength of individual families was not the model in 
Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Indeed there were a number of factors which reduced the 
political power of British industrialists during the industrial revolution and which, in turn, influenced the shape and 
effectiveness of pressure group activity in the years before the First World War. In the first place the government played 
an extremely limited role in British industrialisation and in the early eighteenth century was more inclined to protect 
vested interests in the woollen sector and in the Monied companies than pursue policies to stimulate new industrial   7
sectors such as cotton. (Tolliday 1984: 74; Daniels 1920 : xxvii-ix) This inevitably meant that close personal ties 
between industrialists and government, to be found in some later industrialisers, were missing in Britain.  
If ties between state and industry were weak in Britain during early industrialisation, an even more important 
influence on the relative political power of British industrialists was their exclusion from the national political system 
until the 1830s. It was a factor which had a lasting impact upon the conduct of government- industry relations,  It was 
not therefore until the First Reform Act of 1832 that industrialists were enfranchised and this meant that,  whilst their 
opportunity for the exercise of political power was minimal during the industrial revolution, they were treated as 
outsiders in a world where power and prestige lay with the landed in a broadly aristocratic political system. Moreover, 
even when electoral reform brought the potential for industrialists to exert pressure from within, their ability to do so 
was limited for much of the nineteenth century since they never became the predominant interest group in parliament 
and remained politically and economically divided. Even by 1914 only 94 MPs were industrialists and parliament 
remained dominated by a party organisation which often resisted pressure from businessmen. (Turner 1984 : 4)  
  The ability of industrialists to influence the state can also be affected by the ability of the two groups to 
communicate with and understand each other. In Britain often profound cultural differences separated nineteenth 
century industrialists from the majority of politicians. This, combined with the proud localism of the numerous 
Chambers of Commerce, employers’ associations and specific issue lobbying groups, which proliferated during and 
after the British industrial revolution,  meant that groups of industrialists remained practically and, in terms of values 
and priorities, outside the political system, rather being integrated within it. This feature of British government-industry 
relations was to survive into the twentieth century and had profound implications for the bargaining power of 
industrialists. (Hollis 1974: vii-viii; Blank 1973 : 11)  
The localisation of early business development in Britain inevitably meant that pressure from industrialists 
outside parliament began, at the local level, in the eighteenth century when a number of single issue, often short-lived, 
organisations were formed. In order to demonstrate how pressure groups developed and the limits of their effectiveness 
attention has been focused upon Lancashire, the home of Britain’s most rapidly growing export industry. Given the 
differing economic and political orientation of other localities some care needs to be taken when generalising over the 
impact of interest groups more widely. However, if there are sometimes contrasts in both economic profile and political 
stance at the community level, the notion of British industrialists being ‘outsiders’ in this period remains valid so that 
using Lancashire’s experience to provide insight into government-industry relations remains valid. 
 The prevalence of localised pressure groups was especially noticeable in Lancashire in the eighteenth century 
when a number of associations were formed to influence government on issues of policy. Collusive arrangements 
inhibiting changes in price and output were a rarity in early industrial Lancashire. (Howe 1984: 162) However   8
collective commercial organisations designed to influence government policy appeared especially in Manchester, during 
the late eighteenth century and were a reflection of a growing range of internal and external threats to the wellbeing of 
the cotton interests.  (Redford 1934: 66)  
These early associations were a localised response to a specific set of circumstances, it is not surprising that 
they were similarly short-lived and ineffective. It was not until 1820 that Lancashire’s first permanent commercial 
organisation emerged, when the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was established. A supposedly apolitical body, it 
had the declared intention of lobbying parliament on issues ‘ affecting the commercial interests of Manchester and its 
neighbourhood’. The Chamber recruited relatively widely in Lancashire embracing most regions and sectors. Its council 
was, however, led predominantly from within Lancashire’s enduring family dynasties and mercantile elite, so that it 
favoured the interests of large rather than small firms and of commerce rather than industry.  (Redford 1956: 299; Howe 
1984: 201) The extent to which the Manchester Chamber of Commerce truly reflected the aspirations and concerns of 
Lancashire can, therefore be disputed and some towns, such as Blackburn, believed they lacked representation in the 
decision making process and so were encouraged to establish local Chambers of Commerce and commercial 
associations. (Howe 1984:197-9) Nevertheless the Manchester Chamber of Commerce was to remain the mouthpiece of 
Manchester’s commercial community, if not the whole of Lancashire, until the twentieth century. (Redford 1934:70) 
The development of commercial associations, intent on lobbying parliament, were not the only potential 
sources of political pressure to emerge in Lancashire in this period. The Combination Laws did not prevent the 
formation of employers’ associations in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, even though they made them illegal. 
There remained, for instance, the vestiges of paternalism in domestic sectors with combinations emerging to protect 
handloom weavers. In addition, from the 1830s onwards true employers’ associations began to emerge. These were in 
response to a range of forces including waves of labour unrest and trade union activity,  such as occurred in Preston in 
1836 and 1853-4, changes in profit margins due to altered market conditions and the effects of increased government 
intervention such as came with the extension of the Factory Acts. By the 1860s employers’ associations were active in 
Ashton, Blackburn, Bolton, Burnley, Hyde, Manchester, Oldham, Stockport and Wigan. (McIvor 1996: 36-7; Howe 
1984: 162-4, 175) In general these remained local organisations in this period though the Manchester Committee and 
the National Association of Factory Occupiers, formed respectively in 1833 and 1855, represented broader groupings to 
oppose factory legislation. Accordingly the Manchester Committee represented the interests of eight major textile 
towns, while Robert Hyde Greg’s National Association of Factory Occupiers had an even wider representation. (Howe 
1984: 179)  
If commercial and employers’ associations displayed increasing permanence from the 1820s onwards, 
organisations continued sprang up for specific purposes. Of these the Anti-Corn Law League was easily the most   9
prominent and best known of the early Victorian lobbying groups. That it was needed, to highlight the economic 
benefits of free trade, was a reflection of a reformed political system which still rendered industrialists as ‘outsiders’ 
and where the overall impact of local MPs was limited.  It also was a product of the inadequacies of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce’s attempts to orchestrate opposition to the Corn Laws. (Redford 1934 : 140-7)  The Times 
described the Anti-Corn Law League as ‘ the most advanced political machine this country has yet seen’ ( quoted 
McCord 1958 : 163) . It transformed free trade into a national political issue and gained a more prominent position in 
national life, through its ever-widening propaganda campaigns, than any other radical group. ( McCord 1958 : 15; 
Howe 1997 : 29; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998 : 73) Its fundraising activities, which almost became an end in themselves, 
whereby ever rising sums were pledged in support of repeal, were legendary. Campaigns in 1843,1844/5 and 1846 
raised respectively  £50,000, £100,000 and £250,000, much of it from Manchester. ( Howe 1984 : 212) Even 
electorally, although  the League did not secure a Liberal victory in the 1841, there were successful Anti-Corn Law 
candidates in a number of constituencies inside and outside Lancashire. These included: Cobden (Stockport), Bowring 
(Bolton), Brotherton (Salford), Scott (Walsall), Walker (Bury), Villiers ( Wolverhampton), Philips and Gibson 
(Manchester). (McCord 1958 : 95)  
The prominence of the Anti-Corn Law League does not mean that it should be credited with achieving repeal 
or dictating its timing. That this was so, was a product of both internal and external divisions, the difficulty of achieving 
meaningful influence in parliament and the complexity of the political map in this period. (McCord 1958:108) Pressure 
from without was nevertheless essential to keeping free trade to the forefront of peoples’ minds, at a time when rival 
causes included Chartism and the Poor Laws. The Anti-Corn Law League had ‘turned free trade into a popular moral 
crusade, converting a ‘pocket question’ for the cotton lords into a symbol of a new community of interest and a new 
understanding of nation itself’. (Howe 1997: 36) Yet the timing and scope of Repeal was decided from within 
Parliament and was part of a wider and more complicated political and economic picture than that which concerned the 
Lancashire cotton interests. In this arena outsiders may have orchestrated pressure, but they did not finally precipitate 
change. This was because the decisive battle was parliamentary and the League, after 8 years of struggle, controlled 
neither the procedure nor the terms utilised. ( McCord 1958 : 203-4) Rather the timing was partly dictated by the 
prospect of the Irish potato famine, which gave Peel the opportunity to restructure Irish agriculture and break reliance 
on the potato, while the long-term support of trade liberalisation from the Board of Trade was also a significant factor. 
(McCord 1958:196-7; Brown 1958 : 183; Kinnealy 1998 : 13; Grammp 1987) Repeal must surely also be placed against 
wider economic and  fiscal issues and especially the rise in government deficits during the severe depression from 
1837-1842. This made it easier for Peel to restore income tax and reduce duties on semi-manufactured and 
manufactured goods making the Corn Laws an anomaly. It is inconceivable that it could have been contemplated   10
without these other tariff reforms which Peel secured in his 1842 budget. (Lloyd-Jones 1998: 99)  As had been the case 
in 1818, when duties on raw cotton were substituted for those on printed cottons, success in all campaigns for tax 
reform, depend as much upon the revenue requirements of governments and their ability to tap alternative sources, as 
upon the bargaining power of particular interest groups.  
It might be anticipated that the bargaining power of the Lancashire cotton industry would have grown 
substantially as the nineteenth century progressed and the significance of their exports rose. Yet analysis of efforts to 
manipulate Indian tariffs suggest that their status as outsiders in the political system inhibited their impact while wider 
policy issues, not always fully appreciated by industrialists, remained the overwhelming consideration governments. 
The Manchester Chamber of Commerce, campaigned to gain the largest possible share of the Indian market. However, 
far from enjoying the power and leverage that might be expected from Britain’s premier export industry, cotton industry 
pressure groups were sometimes treated with derision within government circles and by civil servants, especially those 
connected with the India Office. Public school educated and part of a gentlemanly tradition, these individuals had little 
understanding and still less patience with the attitudes and concerns of what they saw as a gauche, whinging, parochial 
interest. For instance, Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India, who had been impatient with Lancashire’s 
demands for reductions of Indian duties in the 1850s, admitted that there were serious dangers for the government and 
Britain if the impending American Civil War created serious social problems. Yet his dislike and incomprehension of 
the cotton masters, whom he described as ‘a hopeless set [who will] do nothing effectual for themselves’, was patently 
obvious. (Harnetty 1972 :14-16; Longmate 1978: 219; Cain and Hopkins 1993 : 177) 
The case of Lancashire is a good illustration of the development of industrial pressure group activity in the 
nineteenth century. Clearly the role of Manchester, in orchestrating the Anti-Corn Law campaign, brought the city a 
national prominence not shared by other industrial cities until Birmingham industrialists became involved in the Tariff 
Reform Movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (Marrison 1995 : 25)More generally, despite 
continued electoral change and the increasing numbers of politicians who were industrialists, Chambers of Commerce 
and other predominantly local organisations continued to play a significant role, as the mouthpieces of industry with 
government, in the years before the First World War. (Blank 1973: 11) In addition local employers’ associations 
proliferated in the staple industries especially after 1860, while concern over growing trade union power in the 1890s 
led to the emergence of sectoral employers’ associations in many industries, such as cotton, coal and engineering. These 
were federations of existing associations which retained substantial powers of veto and membership was never 
universal, so the power of locality was retained. (McIvor 1996) Consequently discussion of issues such as foreign 
competition and the problems of depression remained largely local in nature with protaganists exerting pressure from 
without and lacking much understanding of the codes of practice and wider priorities within the political system.    11
Some ostensibly national extra-parliamentary organisations such as the Employers’ Parliamentary Council and 
the Employers’ Parliamentary Association were set up to lobby parliament on issues which worked against industrial 
interests. (Turner 1984 : 4)  However, there were deep political and economic differences dividing British industrialists 
which made any display of collective political strength difficult to achieve. Indeed dissatisfaction with the Employers’ 
Parliamentary Council led to the formation of the Cotton Employers’ Parliamentary Association in 1899. ( GMRO 
B14/17/1 Cotton Employers’ Parliamentary Association) Such organisations were generally weak and ineffective and 
continued to exert pressure from without never becoming integrated or taken especially seriously within the political 
system. Nor is there much evidence of groups of industrialists using political parties to achieve their aims in this period. 
In terms of political allegiance, generalisation is difficult since there were profound inter and intra regional differences 
in political stance. Where industrialists favoured liberalism, it was a liberalism based upon relatively narrow and 
sometimes shifting and contradictory self interest rather than on an ideological stance. Moreover the prospect of liberal 
welfare reforms held out in Lloyd George’s 1906 budget led to an exodus of business support and marked the 
beginnings of a shift of business interests to the Conservative Party, which gathered momentum in the twentieth 
century. (Turner 1984: 3) Although, subsequently ties with the Conservative party proved mutually beneficial for 
business generally (if not industry in particular) in this period such political uncertainties only served to ensure that 
industrialists continued to enjoy limited bargaining power.  
Italy 
  There were some similarities in the evolution of political power among industrialists in Britain and Italy. Yet, a 
comparison of experience between the two countries reveals many historical contrasts which were to have lasting 
implications for the political bargaining power of industrial interest groups in the two countries well into the twentieth 
century.  Most striking of these is the role of the state which, whilst peripheral in Britain was so central to Italy’s early 
industrialisation. On the one hand, early Italian governments channelled resources into infrastructure development 
including railways, roads and the like while on the other, the State promoted industrial initiatives, especially in steel and 
other heavy sectors [Amatori 1997: 249 ff.]. 
 Instrumental in this process were individuals who had been involved in the political unification of Italy, 
people who remained friends of the State and were also sometimes embedded in both government and industry. The 
combination of proximity to the ruling class and their existing political influence, meant that these people helped to 
initiate some of the most profitable and prestigious activities in the new country. This was, for instance true of Pietro 
Bastogi, a Tuscan banker, who was the Minister of Finance in one of the earliest Italian governments. He was also the 
founder and president of  the Società per la Strade Ferrate Meridionali, a railway society entrusted by the State with the 
construction of the railway between Ancona and Foggia (Amatori and Colli, 1999, ch. 3). To gain parliamentary support   12
and defeat the House of Rothschild,Bastogi stressed that his society was based on Italian finance– even though this was 
not strictly true – and managed to corrupt the parliamentary commission which had to decide about the state concession 
for railway building. It was also as a result of orders and financial aid from the State that the former Risorgimento’s 
patriot and entrepreneur Vincenzo Stefano Breda founded the Terni Steelworks in 1884. Three years later, the 
struggling firm was rescued by the State with the financial support of the Banca Nazionale. Vincenzo Stefano Breda 
who, in meantime, had been elected as senator in the Parliament, went on trial (carried out by the Parliament itself) but 
was discharged( Bonelli 1978). The political class could not, in the end, condemn itself and its ideology. There are 
numerous similar examples during Italy’s early industrial development when, in contrast to Britain, the State pursued 
‘Gerschenkronian’ intervention. This often took the form of rescue packages for loyal ‘friends’ of the state. 
Consequently many otherwise struggling private firms, especially in such strategic sectors as steel were saved from 
failure through State assistance. This Italian alliance of politics and industry  in ways which were both personal and 
financial,  was in sharp contrast to the position in Britain, where industrialists were initially largely excluded from 
national politics, remaining outsiders for many years after they were enfranchised. 
Close government-industry relations were, therefore a feature of the early industrialisation of Italy and the 
political power of industrialists increased initially during the agrarian crisis of the early 1870s. This brought dramatic 
economic change and a shift in support by both farmers and industrialists, from free trade to tariffs (Baglioni 1974: 77 
ff.) . Unlike the position in Britain, where industrialists were ‘outsiders’ in a land dominated political system, in Italy 
the crisis brought the landed aristocracy and the industrial elite together as a formidable lobbying force requiring 
protectionism both for agricultural and industrial products.  Moreover, during the agrarian crisis the notion that Italy 
only avoided ruin through the fruits of industrialisation found a sympathetic audience among the ruling classes, 
significantly bolstering the new role and political strength of  especially entrepreneurs in heavy industry. (Lanaro 1979: 
19 ff.) 
Yet there were some similarities in experience between the two countries. Thus, in Italy, as in Britain, early 
industrialisation was heavily regional and local Chambers of Commerce proved extremely effective mechanisms 
through which local groups of businessmen could pressurise government (see for instance the well known case of Milan 
Chamber of Commerce, Paletta 1998 and Fontana-Magliaretta 1997). However, the power of localities was vastly 
increased in Italy by the numerous local businessmen who became MPs. Consequently pressure was both Parliamentary 
and from the grass-roots through emerging local associations. Chambers of Commerce were, however,  especially 
important in those areas and sectors where numerous small firms meant that individuals exerted minimal power. 
In the Italian case, therefore, for a long period before the emergence of well organized employers associations 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, lobbying by  industrialists was both on a personal basis (a characteristic in any   13
case deeply rooted in Italian government-industry relationships) and by means of locally based associations, of which 
the Chambers of Commerce were an important part. For instance, local Chambers of Commerce produced some 
industrial censuses and statistics, and periodically published reports on the economic situation of a certain area which 
gave important indicators and economic policy suggestions. It should be remembered, however, that the power of these 
locally based associations was limited, and only occasionally were they able to exert stable pressure on the government, 
most especially when they successfully operated together. The local Chambers of Commerce were, however, the first 
organizations to give a stable representation of local interests, when most other initiatives were unstable and short-lived, 
created for only specific and well defined problems. 
When it came to commercial policy Italian industrialists never shared Britain’s enthusiasm for free trade and 
were increasingly staunchly protectionist. However, this contrast does need some clarification, since support for 
protection, whilst strong was not universal and certainly was not shared by export oriented sectors. In Italy protection 
was seen as a necessary condition for industrialisation and the new country needed to industrialise to gain in 
international standing and political influence : an ideology which  emerged soon after unification. (Lanaro 1979: ch. 1; 
Villari 1999: 65 ff.), However, it was strengthened and became increasingly politically influential , after the agrarian 
crisis of the early Seventies, when the traditional specialization of the Italian economy was seriously challenged. In this 
way  protectionism gained a growing consensus among the landed aristocracy and at the beginning of the nineties Italy 
was effectively a protectionist country trying to stimulate the creation of a national heavy industry in steel, engineering, 
mechanical engineering and so on. From this standpoint the pressures exerted by heavy industry over the ruling classes 
found  great support in the nationalist ideology which was so widespread in a new country. It was the same nationalism 
that was the origin of the colonial policies in North Africa which was seen as a promising opportunity of expansion by 
the industrialists.  
Given the growing concentration of political power among industrialists during early industrilialisation it is 
interesting to note that the campaign for protection was pursued jointly by the industrialists in the new, capital intensive 
industries and by the landed aristocracy with these elites  enjoying almost unrestricted access  to the internal market. 
The power of locality and of the heavy industrial sector was also especially evident when the Circolo Industriale e 
Commerciale di Milano, an association of the town’s leading industrialists, successfully lobbied parliament for high 
tariffs on imported iron and steel. This policy helped to achieve the goal of a strong national capital intensive steel 
industry albeit in an inefficient way , (Amatori 1997) However, it worked against the metal working industry, which 
was forced to buy national scrap iron and steel at higher prices than those prevailing internationally but lacked the 
political leverage to do much about it.  This highlights the relative power of the heavy industries, the strategies of 
which, in relation to the State, have been highlighted in much of the historiography. Rather  less attention has been   14
given to traditional, light and export oriented industries (clothing, for instance, wood and leather, artisanal and 
specialized productions, food and beverages) or to the metal working industries . In some cases, as in that of the metal 
trades ( nails, wires, buckles etc)  of Lecco, local interests far from seeking protection, favoured elimination of custom 
tariffs for both  imports of raw materials and above all for finished products’ exported  abroad but were overruled by 
heavy industry. (Colli 1999: 35). The uneveness of political effectiveness between heavy and light industry was a story 
which was to be repeated in the fascist period too. (Colli 1999b). 
In 1914 the First World War unleashed an array of forces in Britain and Italy. However, whereas in Italy the 
power of heavy industry continued to increase in Britain the ties between government and industry, although 
strengthened by war were not very robust when the  prospect of power from ‘within’ became a real, though relatively 
fleeting, possibility. In Britain, following the notorious and embarrassing period of ‘ business as usual’ in the first year 
of the war,  government and industry moved into closer proximity than they had ever experienced before. The state 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Munitions, established in 1915, covered all aspects of industrial production and 
orchestrated a dramatic increase in industrial output,  through initiating changes in technology and industrial 
organisation. Prominent businessmen industrialists, such as Eric Geddes and Dudley Docker,  became closely involved 
in framing both labour and production policies and for the first time there was a move away from the arm’s length 
relationship between government and industry which had characterised relations in the nineteenth century. Equally trade 
union involvement in the decision making process enhanced the power of the TUC. (Kirby 1995 : 57) If the intervention 
of the Ministry of Munitions was intended to be short lived, fears of a trade war with an undefeated Germany prompted 
the formation of the Ministry of Reconstruction the long-term plans of which, had they come to fruition, would have 
altered the template for government-industry relations fundamentally. At the core of these plans, which had the vocal 
and enthusiastic support of Dudley Docker, was the idea of a combination of government-initiated change with a 
corporatist stance designed to create a workable consultative process between government, employers and the labour 
force. ( Kirby and Rose 1991 : 24-27) However, the military, political and economic collapse of Germany in 1918 
removed the incentive for such fundamental changes and most of the plans of the Ministry of Reconstruction were still-
born. (Cline 1982 : 157-81) 
Italian government-industry relations were also reinforced by the war in ways which were a logical conclusion 
of patterns which had emerged during the late nineteenth century. The Mobilitazione Industriale (ie the State agency for 
armaments) left industrialists free to run their enterprises with a militarized workforce while earning enormous profits 
(Amatori and Colli 1999: ch.8). As a result, some enterprises, for instance Ansaldo, but also Fiat and those firms active 
in the steel industry,  grew dramatically through both vertical and horizontal integration. On the other hand relationships 
established among the entrepreneurs, in the most advanced industries and the State during the last two decades of the   15
XIX century intensified and became much more articulated during the war. The State did not nationalise the heavy 
sectors necessary for the war production. Instead enterprises remained in the hands of the entrepreneurs who could 
benefit from huge and growing orders at favourable prices and with a militarized workforce (Castronovo 1995: 203). As 
shown in the Ansaldo case, the growth of the main Italian industrial groups rarely stemmed from the quest for 
efficiency and scale economies but were much more often driven by the desire to enhance the enterprise’s political 
bargaining power with the state. The end of the War again saw the State bailing out these vast business groups, further 
strengthening the ties between big business and government in a trend which continued in the Fascist period (Amatori 
1997: 256-7).  
The close financial ties between government and industry, detected even in the nineteenth century, continued 
in Italy during the First World War. At that time some industrialists, like the Perrone brothers owners of the Ansaldo, a 
former heavy engineering and naval factory in Genoa, started an impressive program creating a giant, vertically 
integrated trust embracing everything from the iron mines of Aosta Valley to the machine shops of Genoa. Their 
purpose, financially supported by the State and by a bank, the Banca Italiana di Sconto, which was effectively strictly 
connected to the trust itself, was a “patriotic” one, largely shared by the political and military élites of the time: a new, 
political and economic power like Italy needed  powerful heavy industries and the war provided the opportunity to 
create them. Individuals such as the Perrone brothers, who were prepared to take the risk of setting one up, gained State 
support.  However, the outcome differed from the brothers’ intentions. They implemented part of their strategy, but 
their undertaking was unable to withstand the period of reconstruction,  at the end of the war, which so limited the 
internal market. The financial crisis of the Banca Italiana di Sconto led to the failure of the Ansaldo trust, even if the 
State, by means of the Bank of Italy, in the end succeeded in rescuing the engineering  activities of the Genoese firm 
(Webster 1974; Row 1997) 
As well as seeing growing links between government and industry in Italy, the First World War also marked a 
period of consolidation for general employers’ associations such as Confederazione Generale dell’Industria a force 
which indirectly played a role in the evolution of closer government-industry relations in the Fascist period. After the 
war the return to normalcy saw increasing tensions between employers and workers. This was especially noticeable 
during the so-called ‘Biennio Rosso’ (‘Red Two Years’) when the number of strikes grew considerably and the 
employers reacted to the situation by closing their plants,  which were immediately occupied by the workers. This 
brought the country perilously near a socialist revolution. The government of Giovani Giolitti seemed to support the 
requests of the workers, and in so doing lost the support of industrialists. Businessmen in their turn were hostile towards 
any form of State intervention in the capital-labour relatonships, unless the ‘estabilished order’ was under threat.(Adler   16
1995: 160 ff.; Berta 1996: 57 ff. Castronovo 1995: 236 ff) During these difficult years the Confederazione played a 
major role becoming a stable representative of the industrialists’ interest. 
 
III The Interwar period 
 
  Clearly, even before the First World War, there were some sharp differences in government- industry relations 
between Britain and Italy. These manifest themselves most particularly in the emergence of potentially powerful 
groupings in the heavy industrial sector in Italy,  which had enjoyed political power almost since unification. This had 
come  through a combination of economic significance  of such industries as iron and steel but was also based upon 
personal contact. It had created the framework for effective protectionist lobbying in the late nineteenth century, despite 
opposition from export oriented industries. No industry in Britain enjoyed such cosy relations with government in the 
nineteenth century as iron and steel did in Italy and although the cotton industry dominated the export oriented 
economy,  its entrepreneurs largely remained outsiders in the political system. Clearly the First World War had brought 
about some changes, especially in relations between the armaments’ industry and the government (Singleton 1993 : 
229-258) Yet British industry (whether heavy or light) remained relatively impotent in its dealing with the state at a 
time when government-industry relations were reinforced in Italy. 
In Britain the casting aside of the war-time vision of the Ministry of Reconstruction and the hasty ‘return to 
normalcy’ in the role of government and its financial arrangements, which followed the armistice, did not wipe out all 
the changes which had occurred and whilst it is an exaggeration to see the First World War as marking a shift towards 
corporatist government-industry relations in Britain,  some changes in organisation were lasting. For instance the 
establishment of national bodies such as the Federation of British Industry in 1916 marked a significant and lasting 
break with the past. As Sir Raymond Streat observed the First World War ‘cut the first slit in the opaque curtain 
between industry and government’. ( quoted Blank 1973 : 11) Yet organisational changes should not be confused with 
changes in attitude and there is considerable evidence that before the war civil servants and the military had been happy 
to exploit the comparative inexperience of industrialists and out manoeuvre them with ease. It was a trend which the 
war did nothing to reverse (Singleton 1993: 229-258; Jones 1984) The lasting impact of industrialists becoming 
‘insiders’ during the war seems to have been limited. 
The Federations of British Industry’s founder, the productioneer Dudley Docker, envisaged a business 
grouping which would achieve industrial modernisation against a background of corporatist labour relations and tariff  
reform. Fundamentally he saw the FBI as a vehicle to secure ‘insider’ status for industry  and involve industrialists 
directly in the process of government. (Davenport-Hines 1984: 106) However, although membership grew, from 337   17
firms and associations in 1917 to 1,392 in 1920, his hopes were not realised and Federation of British Industry did not 
become either the automatic mouthpiece of industry or an integral part of the British political system during the 
interwar period. There were a number of reasons for this, and some have suggested that deep divisions on the tariff 
question lay at the heart of the FBI’s interwar problems. Yet, since new evidence points to fairly widespread support for 
tariff reform, the more plausible explanation is that Dockers’ ideas on labour relations alienated many employers 
leading to a general unwillingness to confront potentially divisive issues. (Davenport-Hines 1984 : 118-20; Marrison 
1995; Blank 1973: 29) 
Internal divisions rendered the pursuit of radical strategies by the FBI a hopeless dream, yet this was not the 
only reason why its overall impact was limited in the interwar period. This is because the FBI was not the only 
ostensibly national cross-sectoral organisation representing industry and the rival British Manufacturers’ Association  
(set up in 1914 to represent the interests of British large firms and soon to become the National Union of 
Manufacturers) did not merge with the FBI until 1965. (Blank 1973 : 19) Nor was creation of such organisations seen as 
the only way forward. The British Commonwealth Union shared some of the concerns of the FBI, regarding the role of 
industry in government and tariff reform, but  was an overtly political organisation which believed that securing 
business representation in parliament was the most effective way of influencing policy decisions. It was  set up by 
British industrialists in 1916 to confront foreign competitors in political as well as industrial ways especially with 
regard to the tariff question. Seen as a liability by members of the FBI and the Tariff Reform Movement, its 
comparative failure highlights the relative political backwardness of British business in this period.  (Davenport-Hines 
1984:1920-1; Marrison 1995: 324-6; Turner 1978 : 553-4)  
It was not just the case that it was hard for industrialists as a group to articulate their needs and find consensus. 
At the level of individual industries pressure groups remained relatively impotent in their relations with the state. The 
problems of industrialists as ‘outside’ lobbyists was especially noticeable in the difficulties encountered by Lancashire’s 
industrialists, attempting to first reverse and later modify Indian tariff changes during the 1920 and 1930s. Before the 
First World War a vast cultural divide had separated Lancashire from both the London government and from those 
governing India. This was partly eroded by individuals within the Manchester Chamber of Commerce which remained 
the cotton industry’s mouthpiece in this period. The Chamber’s Secretary, Raymond Streat,  proved a tireless 
ambassador, building close personal relationships with key political figures, especially the Earl of Derby- dubbed the 
‘King of Lancashire’ for his championing of the industry. Articulate, urbane and with finely tuned political antennae, 
Streat appeared the ideal negotiator, seemingly equally at home in Manchester or with London politicians. ( see (ed) 
Dupree 1987 Vol. 1) Yet the difficulties he and his colleagues encountered on Indian tariffs highlights the complexities 
of lobbying on commercial policy, whilst demonstrating the growing limitations of Lancashire’s bargaining power with   18
government. A number of factors made progress tortuous and these ranged  from the political complexity of all 
decisions involving India in this period, to the limited political power of Lancashire’s MPs and Lancashire concerns. In 
addition, an in-built and mutual distrust which existed between all branches of manufacturing in Lancashire and the 
merchant-dominated Manchester Chamber of Commerce, created at times, a climate of confusion regarding whose 
views the Chamber was championing.  
The main obstacle to progress was the delicacy of  the Indian political position, after the First World War. 
Fiscal autonomy became a potent symbol of the growing Independence movement  in India between 1918 and 1921 and 
when the surfacing of Nationalist tensions coincided with increasing budgetary difficulties in the Subcontinent the 
government in London was left with little alternative but to sanction the bolstering  of the wartime tariff. The 
progressive increase of duties from 3 ½% to 7 ½% during the war was intended to deal with budgetary problems, whilst 
that to 11% in 1921, despite opposition from Lancashire was an attempt to pacify the Nationalists and simultaneously 
raise revenue. (Chatterji 1992 : 202-4) Indian import tariffs had not peaked in 1921, however, and in 1930 they were  
raised to 15% and peaked at 25% a year later . (Tomlinson 1994: 348) Broadly, any support which the Government 
showed for Lancashire, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, had to be weighed against the budgetary and political 
consequences for India. This became especially noticeable in the 1930s, as the National Government strove to achieve 
constitutional reform for India at a time when the Lancashire cotton industry was in a state of collapse. In 1933,  the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Federation of Master Cotton Spinners’ Association prepared a joint statement 
opposing the idea of fiscal autonomy to be given as evidence before the Joint Select Committee on Indian 
Constitutional Reform. This unprecedented co-operation was a measure of the depth of concern over Indian tariffs that 
was felt throughout Lancashire. 
In the event the evidence was changed and Lancashire’s views on Indian tariffs were couched in such moderate 
terms that their thrust was lost. This became the centre of a major, if brief, political controversy initiated by Winston 
Churchill, who invoked the Privileges Committee of the House of Commons  against Lord Derby and Sir Samuel 
Hoare.   He accused them both of using undue influence on members of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to 
persuade them to change their evidence.  Although the case was thrown out and Churchill has been cast as a mischief 
maker opposed to Indian Reform, the true origins of the changes remain somewhat obscure and the consequences for 
Lancashire and its relations with the Government unclear. Streat, who was intimately involved in the case, was 
contemptuous of Churchill’s intentions emphasising that it was the delicate position reached in the India Mission talks 
in November 1933 which led to the change. He was also critical of both his colleague Sir Thomas Barlow who he felt 
had panicked and of those in the industry who condemned the emasculation of Lancashire’s evidence, believing them to 
be politically naïve. He is doubtless correct that the majority of manufacturers lacked his experience and understanding   19
of political negotiation. Yet the Privileges Committee was composed entirely of members nominated by Party Whips of 
all three parties who supported the Government’s policy in India and was clearly not objective. ( Churchill 1959 : 595) 
Equally , whilst Streat was keen to emphasise the importance of the India Mission for Lancashire, taking it as a sign of 
the high esteem with which the industry was held by the Government , it is probable that his position at the centre of the 
talks led him to overestimate the importance attached to the industry he represented. It is not clear, therefore, whether 
the true motive for the changes was indeed to salvage the India Mission and secure something for Lancashire or rather 
that a breakdown of the talks,  precipitated by the evidence, would have had serious and wide political implications for 
relations between London and the sub continent. Moreover, the incident serves to confirm the ease with which even the 
apparently politically adept Streat could become embroiled by the sophisticated political games of others and easily be 
outmanoeuvred by them. Eventually, the Lees-Mody Pact of November 1933 brought agreement the principle of 
amending Indian tariffs on imported cotton goods and this was followed in 1936 by a reduction of the tariff on 
Lancashire goods to 20%. (Robson 1957 : 265; Dupree 1990 : 110) However, this was mainly the result of  continuing 
Japanese import penetration of the Indian market and was set alongside a 75% tariff against foreign, especially 
Japanese, goods. The best that can be said is that without the pressure which the cotton industry's representatives 
brought to bear, it is likely that market conditions would have been even worse. (Dupree 1990: 106-8)  
At the very least this episode serves to emphasise the extent to which Lancashire interests were a relatively 
minor priority for a Government facing the likelihood of Indian independence and the consequences which this would 
have, especially for the City of London. Although briefly eclipsed during the First World War the power of the City to 
influence the affairs of state were underpinned by cultural ties with both Treasury and Government which while 
difficult to quantify and itemise reinforced the regular technical consultations which occurred on monetary and financial 
matters. (Cassis 1994 : 286; Cain and Hopkins 1993 : 50-57) In such a difficult environment., Lancashire’s case cannot 
have been helped by the lack of mutual understanding and sympathy which existed between the Manchester Chamber of 
Commerce and industrialists. In his diary Streat made no secret of his contempt for the industrialists he was 
representing and whilst some ( though not all, Oldham and Blackburn being important exceptions) employers’ 
association minutes frequently reveal considerable parochialism, it was an attitude which cannot have helped to create 
an impression of unity . 
The changing and increasingly difficult international political and economic conditions of the 1930s had 
implications for the interaction of industry and the state in Britain and could, in certain circumstances created a degree 
of reciprocity in which industrialists became actively, if indirectly and inadvertently involved in policy. Although the 
National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers had emerged during the First World War ‘the steel lobby remained 
a muted, internally divided affair’ in the 1920s and played no active role in the 1923 tariff election. ( Tolliday 1984 : 53;   20
Tolliday 1987 : 293) In the 1920s internal divisions removed any hope of securing tariff protection for the steel 
industry. Yet Depression led to a shift in bargaining power in favour of the heavy steel sector, which brought them both 
tariff protection and placed them in a position of potential reciprocity with the government in the area of international 
cartel arrangements. In the conditions of growing international crisis experienced during the 1930s Whitehall became 
increasingly aware that international negotiations between industrialists could be less sensitive than inter-governmental 
negotiations and bring benefits for both state and industry. In the steel industry momentum for the quest for an 
international cartel agreement with Germany came from the industry but received the support of government as part of a 
complex war-game. Cotton was of less strategic importance to the government than steel yet, at the initiative of the 
government, industry representatives became embroiled in unsuccessful inter-industry negotiations with the Japanese 
over a cotton cartel. Such moves can be seen as a cynical manipulation of politically inexperienced industrialists who 
unwittingly became involved in international relations at a time when political relations were fragmenting. ( Wurm 
1993 : 299)  
In Italy  and especially for heavy industry,  the political and economic turmoil of the interwar period further 
reinforced the increasingly reciprocal links between industry and the state. In the 1920s it was on the basis of hostility 
towards the late liberal governments and towards the bureaucratic structure of the State that Mussolini obtained  
growing support from the industrialists (Melograni 1980). At the beginning Mussolini’s support came from the 
landowners who feared a socialist and communist revolution; after the ‘Marcia su Roma’ [The March on Rome] of 
October 1922, the relationship between the fascism and the industrialists remained quite loose. However, the economic 
policy of the new Fascist government, which initially aimed at a sharp reduction in the presence of the State in the 
economy and of fiscal pressure, was welcomed by the industrialists. The so called ‘produttivismo’, i.e. the support 
given to the free private initiative was the policy undertaken by the Fascists during this first period, and was a (even if 
not original) response given to the general economic growth of the mid-Twenties (Gualerni 1980: 40 ff.). The 
industrialists did not support the Fascists very strongly at the beginning, appreciating only the ‘social function’ of the 
movement necessary to contain the workers’ protest.  
The relationship among the industrialists and the Regime was, however,  growing in intensity and articulation. 
For instance, Mussolini’s revaluation of the lira was undertaken for ideological and nationalistic reasons but had 
considerable economic effects. Indeed, if exports suffered a considerable fall (above all in the traditional, light, export-
oriented industries), the reduction of the inflation was possible thanks to the compulsory reduction of wages. Again, the 
authority shown by the Fascist regime in this situation reinforced the national investors’ trust in the Italian economy, 
and led to a substantial and growing flow of international finance (especially from the U.S.) into Italy. (Toniolo 1980: 
83 ff.)    21
The growing closeness of the government-industry relations  took varying forms during the interwar period. 
There was for instance the prosecution of the ‘bargaining policy’ whereby entrepreneurs undertook  investments not for 
economic but for ‘strategic’ reasons. These include the case of Arturo Bocciardo, the leader of the Terni steel works,  
which had been progressively transformed into a diversified industrial group producing a range of goods  from steel to 
chemical products to electricity. During the Thirties Bocciardo granted the prosecution of the non-economic steel 
production while Mussolini granted  Terni favourable prices for the electricity it sold. Similarly, Montecatini, the most 
important national chemical company, obtained the monopoly of  the Italian market for fertilizers. In return the firm 
was asked by Mussolini to rescue various companies active in totally different fields, from marble to syntethic dyes 
(Amatori 1997, 285). In the motor car industry too, Fiat obtained massive protection in the internal market against 
foreign penetration thanks to high custom tariffs (Castronovo 1999: 418 ff.).  
Mussolini’s practice of orchestrating rescues was at first sporadic, but the policy gatherered momentum until 
the creation of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). This  State-owned holding company had among its 
main tasks the granting of long term loans to the companies which had been affected by the Depression (Amatori 1997, 
257. At the same time it took over the industrial securities held by the three Italian main banks (Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, Credito Italiano and Banco di Roma). In the end, in 1936 IRI was declared a permanent institution and 
controlled most national heavy industry.  
If financial ties between government and heavy industry became increasingly tight during the Fascist period, 
the relationship between Mussolini and Italian entrepreneurs became more and more ideologically-based. One of the 
political tasks of the Fascist regime was the creation of a ‘Corporatist State’ in which class conflict had to be eliminated 
thanks to the co-operation between the workers and the entrepreneurs. The result of this policy was not the socialization 
of enterprises, as some of the most radical Fascist ideologists required but the Confederazione Generale dell’Industria 
became the only interlocutor of the Regime, and succeeded in obtaining the monopoly the capital-labour relationships 
overcame the resistance of,  for instance,  of the small-employers’ associations which were closed or absorbed by the 
main organisation (Colli 1999: 834).  
In the end, the relationships among the entrepreneurs and the State (and above all among the entrepreneurs 
active in the strategic sectors of the economy, i.e. those capital intensive industries) during the Fascist period show a 
high degree of continuity with the past. Not only the bargaining practice went on, and also the use of rescues by the 
state, but also the entrepreneurs’ association obtained a substantial, political legitimacy and monopoly and a sharp 
control, in the end, over the labour force.   22
IV Conclusion 
  It is strikingly clear if the political power of industrialists is compared in Britain and Italy in the interwar 
period that there were sharp contrasts in experience, which can be explained by a combinations of historical, 
institutional and socio-cultural forces stretching back to the nineteenth century. The timing of industrialisation may be 
significant since whilst Gerschenkron’s interpretation of the significant role of the state, in relatively backward 
industrialisers, has proved contraversial there is evidence that in Italy the state initiated and encouraged heavy industry. 
This was in sharp contrast to the position in Britain where, governments may have facilitated growth through the 
mercantilist policies, there were few historic links between industry and the state. However, it is not enough to say that 
the comparative impotence of British industrialists compared with the captains of Italian ‘big business’ was the result of 
differences in the experience of industrialisation. It is necessary to consider the socio-political underpinnings of 
government industry relations to understand why British industrialist were most usually ‘outsiders’ whilst the heads of 
Italy’s large industrial groups were, as early as the 1870s, ‘insiders’. British captain’s of industry were not enfranchised 
until  the 1830s and even then were numerically of limited impact in parliament. More important until the late 
nineteenth century social and cultural divisions from a still landed parliament and from that major organ of state the 
Treasury reduced the ability to influence the state on issues of policy.  
In Italy, on the other hand, there were direct political ties between those political elites who wanted unification 
and industry which were both direct and metaphorical. Some key movers in unification and members of the first 
parliaments were also industrialists ( or at least financiers and bankers) There began a symbiotic relationship between 
the two movements which time served to reinforce. Moreover, such an overlap also meant that the hopes and aspirations 
of the government and industry coincided more often than it conflicted rendering industrialists ‘insiders’ in ways not 
replicated in Britain at any period before the Second World War. Equally during the 1870s and 1880s industry was 
lauded as the potential saviour of agricultural Italy enhancing industrialists’ bargaining power. Differences in the 
political system in Britain and Italy are also critical here, for Britain’s centralised political system undermined localities, 
whereas in Italy with a far more decentralised system, localities and regions were and remain politically significant. 
Likewise historical forces mean that big business is extremely powerful in Italy. The crucial factor, however, which 
underpinned the emergence of reciprocal arrangements in the Fascist period was the critical financial role of the state, 
which began in the 1870s and was reinforced by the First World War. Historically Italian governments launched rescue 
packages for their friends in ‘big business’ and this was especially noticeable after the First World War. Ties had 
developed in Britain between the state and armaments producers during the First World War but in other staple 
industries not only were there no financial links but any trend toward corporatism, which began during the First World   23
War, was reversed with the defeat of Germany. Whilst interwar governments tacitly supported collusive arrangements 
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